Takenori Horimoto, Explaining India’s Foreign Policy: From Dream to Realization of Major Power, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 17, Issue 3, September 2017, Pages 463–496, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcx011
Navbar Search Filter Mobile Enter search term Search Navbar Search Filter Enter search term SearchA power transformation appears to be taking place in Asia, brought about by the rapid emergence of China and the relative decline of US influence. India has sought a way to cope with this new situation. India itself has been rising to prominence since the 1990s, particularly its nuclear weapon tests in 1998 onward. Since the start of the twenty-first century, India has been perceived as the next country to follow China in seeking a major power status. Although India has previously tended to conceal its power aspirations, in 2015 it declared its intention to be a leading power. This article elucidates this transformation through India's policy orientation on a local, regional, and global level and its key partnerships with Russia and Japan. India’s metamorphosis holds great implications for the transformation of power in Asia.
After the Cold War, particularly since the 2000s, the rapid rise of China has presented a challenge to United States (US) influence. Although the US can still be regarded as the sole superpower, its relative decline is stark. Asian players, such as Japan, the ASEAN countries and Australia, and India, have been encountering and adapting to the new circumstances, which might be designated as a power transformation in Asia.
Although the US and China can be regarded as the two major powers of the present and the future, among the Asian players, India is trying evidently to catch up with those two countries as a major power, albeit lagging perhaps one or two laps behind them.
Hence, the main objective of this article is to present an examination of how India is attempting to construct its overall foreign policy in the current international situation and beyond. To state the conclusion at the beginning, India is trying to respond to the emerging situation by aiming to become a major power itself in the future. India has been a reluctant player in the international theater since its independence in 1947 until the 2000s. With the start of the 2010s, however, India has metamorphosed itself into a dynamic actor and has switched from denying to affirming its status as a major power. The dearth of literature on India's transformation requires further examination. Accordingly, this article is an attempt to provide a comprehensive view of India's foreign policy. There is hardly any literature on this topic, and therefore this article is an attempt to elucidate a holistic view of India’s foreign policy.
In this context, it might be required to touch upon the definition of a major power. There is no established definition of a major power, but some experts offer helpful clues in relation to India. Perkovich (2003–04), for instance, points out that ‘India cannot get other important states to comply with Indian demands … India does have the capability to resist demands placed upon it by other countries.’ Others argue that India’s foreign policy objective is to become a major power in terms of having the capability to alter the international system or to be perceived as a major power ( Kondo, 2012, p. 7). 1
Delving into India’s strategic response to the power transformation in Asia and examining India’s objectives, this article presents four sections. The first section provides a brief historical context of India’s foreign policy responses to the situation prevailing in Asia between the end of the Second World War and the 1990s. The principal characteristic of the period would be India’s self-conception of the inadequacy of its capabilities. It is possible to say the perception has epitomized the basic factor for India’s foreign policy of non-alignment and its alliance with the Soviet Union.
The second section, which mainly addresses the 2010s, analyzes the puzzling rationale behind India’s major power intentions. Putting it another way, this period shows the metamorphosis of India's foreign policy as distinctively different from that of the preceding long period. In order to clarify such difference, the section shows India’s foreign policy matrix. The matrix offers a basic and overall framework and perception toward understanding India’s foreign policy goals.
The third section discusses India’s close relations with Russia and Japan—currently India's two key partners. The author believes that India, in order to smoothly engineer its foreign policies at regional and global levels, seeks alignments with these two prominent players. Geopolitically speaking, India is striving to cope with an assertive China through its relations with Russia in Eurasia and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. The concluding section considers how India might proceed with its foreign policy orientation.
The main thrust of this article examines how India’s quest to be a major power concretized in the middle of 2010s after the long period of caution on the international stage. Through elucidating India’s foreign policy in the past six decades after independence, it is possible to bring the recent emergence of India’s foreign policy as a major power into sharp relief.
India, which was partitioned from British India and achieved independence in August 1947, had several basic attributes of a typical major power: its history, size, and location. Study of its history reveals that India has a distinctive feature: ‘Of the great world civilizations, only India and China embody a civilization in a single large nation-body politic’ (Cohen, 2001, p. 51). Although India under British colonial rule was not a sovereign state, it became an original member of the United Nations (UN) at its foundation in 1945. As such, India is in a position to claim its status as the successor state of British India. Pakistan, another partitioned entity of British India, joined the UN in September 1947 as a new state.
In addition, India is one of the largest countries in terms of population and area. Its area is nine times bigger than that of Japan. Moreover, India occupies a central location in the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, these attributes have not naturally catapulted India into major power status, particularly because of its lack of national power in terms of economic size and defense capability. The lack of national power left India with the empty daydream of becoming a major power. It was a major country, but its sphere of influence was essentially limited to the South Asian region. Given those circumstances, India’s foreign policy options have remained rather constrained.
Such limitations were readily apparent during the Cold War period. First, India established and maintained its so-called non-alignment policy as its basic tenet of foreign policy between the 1940s and the 1960s under its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The policy meant alignment to neither the US camp nor the Soviet camp. Although this was true, this definition explains one-half of the important aspects of the non-alignment. The other half was in finding common causes with other non-aligned countries such as Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and Egypt with which it could act in concert.
The non-alignment policy was jettisoned in the early 1970s. However, India officially claimed it as a continuous policy during the era of rapprochement between the US and China, and when the Second India–Pakistan war (also known as the Bangladesh independence war) was imminent in December 1971. China and Pakistan developed an all-weather relationship in the 1960s and have maintained it subsequently. Since ‘for thousands years military threats to India have been perceived as coming primarily from India’s northwest’ ( Brewster, 2012, p. 26), the emerged combination of Pakistan to the west and China to the north amplified India’s threat perception further.
In contrast, India effectively abandoned its non-aligned policy by signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on 9 August 1971, which specified mutual strategic cooperation. If alliances are to be defined as ‘formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military forces, in specified circumstance, against outside their own membership’ ( Snyder, 1997, p. 4), the treaty 2 signified the creation of bilateral relations between India and the Soviet Union and aligned these states ( Horimoto and Lalima, 2013, pp. 5–8).
Therefore, The Times (London) noted that: ‘India today discarded her policy of non-alliance and entered into a formal coalition with the Soviet Union.’ 3 It is noteworthy, however, that India has officially maintained its foreign policy of non-alignment, even after signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty, as outlined in the Ministry of External Affairs’ Annual Reports during the period under review.
Therefore, since independence, India has transformed its foreign policy from non-alignment to alliance with the Soviet Union. Regarding this transformation, I would like to introduce an opposite view among Japanese scholars specializing in the study of India's foreign policy. Namely, ‘Even though the treaty was an alliance in nature, if the bilateral relations of India and Russia were made up of mutually dependable relations based upon independence, the relations were equal, then logically speaking, the treaty is not a so-called Cold War alliance and did not contradict the non-alignment principles’ ( Yoshida, 2001, p. 46). But this author opines rather differently. Since in those days, India depended heavily on Russia for trade and defense acquisitions, Indo-Russia relations could not be readily regarded as equal.
Why was India compelled to alter its policy? The basic factor would be the insufficiency of its national power. The alignment of non-aligned countries was the first option, followed by alignment with the Soviet Union. India could not afford to go it alone. India has been bound to adopt various alignment policies. 4 The net result of India’s two foreign policies was an ineffectual presence on the international stage. India’s alliance with the Soviet Union was generally perceived to render it a dependent actor in the prevailing international political scene.
P.A.N. Murthy, India's East Asian specialist, has regarded India as an intermediate power in the bipolar international order, which could not be regarded ‘as a corner or a pole by itself ( Murthy, 1986, p. 391).
Entering into the 1990s, India was faced with a difficult situation. Among others, the collapse of the Soviet Union meant India had lost the mainstay of its foreign policy. India had no alternative but to grope at initiating various new policies. This presented difficult challenges for India because ‘India has generally seen itself as a world power in making, and conducted its regional and international relations on this basis. The result has been insignificance abroad, suspicion in the region and turbulence at home’ ( Thakur, 1992).
Moreover, the Soviet Union was not just India's principal partner, but its major trading partner. Because of the Gulf War of 1990–91, oil price spikes, and a sharp reduction of home remittances from Indians overseas in the Middle East, India faced the prospect of defaulting on its loans. It had no alternative but to seek assistance from IMF loans. In return for that assistance, India was required to deregulate its economic system and to open up its economy from the closed approach it had maintained during the Cold War period. Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister in June 1991 and in the following month introduced economic liberalization together with Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (later prime minister).
The transformation of the Indian economy and the crash of the Soviet Union, along with the changed international structure, have compelled India to overhaul its foreign policy altogether. Many foreign policy initiatives were launched in the 1990s. In 1992, Rao visited the US. For India, the US was ‘on occasion friendly, sometimes hostile, but, more often, just estranged’ ( Kux, 1993, p. 447) during the Cold War period. That remark might not be an overstatement. After all, India’s foreign policy has mirrored its policy toward the US during the last half-century.
Rao visited China in 1993 and concluded an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility concerning the lines of actual control between India and China. The essence of the agreement can be distilled as normalization of the relationship by shelving the knotty issue of their mutual border (Horimoto, 2014b). The Look-East Policy has been followed since 1993 ( Haidar, 2012, p. 53). This new orientation resulted in India achieving the status of a Dialog Partner of ASEAN in 1994 and becoming an ARF member the next year. This change of status was attributable to a change of perception by ASEAN, enabling it ‘to digest the implications of China’s rise, not just as an economic power but also as a military power’ ( Naidu, 2013, p. 63).
During the latter half of the 1990s, India set up its first strategic partnership with South Africa in 1997. Creating strategic partnerships became established as one of India’s foreign policy pillars ( Horimoto, 2012). As of 2015, India has maintained strategic partnerships with 28 countries. At the end of the 1990s, India conducted atom bomb tests in 1998, for the second time since 1974. These tests were vehemently denounced worldwide, but helped to elevate India’s image as a major power.
All these policy initiatives impressed the world with a fresh image of India, but they were miscellaneous initiatives without any clear indication of a new objective of India’s foreign policy. Naturally, India’s foreign policy invited various critiques: ‘Even as India’s rise in the interstate global hierarchy continues steadily, its policymakers still act in the international arena as if India can continue to afford the luxury of responding to foreign policy challenges on a case-by-case basis with no requirement for a long-term strategic policy framework. The same ad hoc-ism that had characterized Indian foreign policy in the past lingers’ ( Pant, 2009). Similarly, Rajiv Sikri (former Foreign Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs) said ‘India must have a clear grand strategic design’ ( Sikri, 2009, p. 300).
These critical remarks could be directed toward India’s foreign policy in the two decades of the 1990s and the 2000s. They might be correct assessments for India of the 1990s, but India of the 2000s onward presents a completely changed picture. Upon entering the 2000s, India’s inclination to become a major power gradually emerged. One might say that 1998 was the latent starting point of this intention, but that India's nuclear achievements turned out to be a pipedream until the term BRICs came into popular use in 2001. The BRICs 5 were introduced to the public by the then Chair of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Jim O'Neill, in his publication Building Better Global Economic BRICs ( O’Neil, 2001). BRICs denoted the group of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, all sharing their bright prospects of emerging economies. India lived up to these predictions. It showed a high economic growth rate of 8–10 percent between financial years 2003 and 2010 ( Ishigami, 2017, p. 52).
Such amazing economic performance has given India great self-confidence. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the then ruling party, presented its slogan of ‘Shining India’ in its 2004 General Election manifesto. C. Raja Mohan, India’s leading strategic thinker, has said: ‘After disappointing itself for decades, India is now on the verge of becoming a great power’ ( Mohan, 2006). India’s momentum of emergence continued into the 2010s. The China Daily remarked upon India's great power ambitions when India launched the Agni, a medium-range missile in December 2011. 6 The Economist in 2013 published a special issue carrying the title India as a Great Power. 7
Consequently, India looked to be emerging on the global stage in the 2000s and 2010s. Nevertheless, the Government of India (GOI) itself has never publicly proclaimed the country to be a major power and has instead adhered to its traditional external policy of cooperation or alliance with like-minded nations. The first document made public by GOI was the Report of GOM on National Security, which suggests that India has no reasonable alternative but to opt for closer relations with the US ( Group of Ministers, 2001).
The second document was The Challenge: India and the New American Global Strategy, 2006, which was submitted to Prime Minister Singh by the task force headed by K. Subrahmanyam, who was assumed to be the greatest strategic thinker in independent India. Although this document remains secret, Sanjaya Baru disclosed the gist of it as ‘the time has come for India to advance its interests through greater integration with the global economy, making the best use of economic opportunities provided by developed economies, especially the US’ ( Baru, 2014, p. 168). It carries an almost identical tone to that of the 2001 report.
Certainly, and particularly for foreigners, these documents provide excellent materials and data elucidating India’s current foreign policy. Aside from these two, since the 2000s, various arguments have been put forth to characterize India’s foreign policy as a diversified, multilateral policy. However, they remain incomplete, failing to provide a total picture of foreign policy, particularly the main objectives of its foreign policy. Perhaps, India might have had difficulty taking suitable steps during the transitional period because India’s emergence as a major power is a recent phenomenon.
Although India has been generally acknowledged to be a future major power, an interesting and strange phenomenon emerged: India’s negation of such a status and role. Perhaps one can find a similar tendency in the report Nonalignment2.0 in 2012 ( Khilnani et al., 2012), which has been regarded as a quasi-official document. In it, one might identify the basic principles used to guide India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. The report is filled with references to India as a major power, but is wary of this status, suggesting rather that the country should maintain its status of strategic autonomy. Subsequently, the report attracted severe criticism particularly from the strategic community in India. 8 Its main argument can be summarized as emphasizing strategic autonomy and the means to realize this ( Khilnani et al., 2012)
India’s wariness has been pointed out by Miller, who observed that India’s diplomatic elites tend to resist the rise of their own country ( Miller, 2013). In a similar vein, M.K. Narayanan, India’s ex-National Security Advisor, has characterized India as a reluctant power ( Narayanan, 2014). In addition, India has been characterized as using swing-state policies ( Kliman and Fontaine, 2012).
One can interpret such wariness from the historical tendency of India’s strategically defensive posture ( Tanham, 1992, pp. 52–53). A similar analytical attempt has been made to explain the application of the strategic restraint concept to India’s defense policy after its independence, which shows no clear-cut approach ( Cohen and Dasgupta, 2010).
India seemed to have adopted à la Taoguang Yanghui () the line of biding one’s time while strengthening one’s power. This has been the basis of China’s external policy propounded by Deng Xiaoping and observed by Hu Jintao, but not currently by Xi Jinping. This approach is now taken only by the the US. 9 In short, India aspires to be a major power, but it continues to conceal its true objective. If India were to set out its aspiration of becoming a major power, it might elicit unfavorable situations and reactions. India looked to have adopted its Taoguang Yanghui under the prevailing circumstance then.
This makes it difficult to draw comparisons with other rising powers. The geopolitical condition that has driven Indian strategic thinking through the Cold War is sui generis in nature. For example, China adopted Deng Xiaoping’s tenets, Japan mobilized its resources, and sought to become an economic power and achieve great power status under the Yoshida Doctrine. However, there remained several inconsistencies in Indian economic policies and security interests which compelled it to seek help from both the US and the Soviet Union at different times of crisis.
Now, one can discern a shift of India’s foreign policy since the BJP came to power as a result of the General Election in April to May 2014. The BJP won 282 seats out of 543 seats of the Lok Sabha (the lower house) with allied parties winning a further 54 seats. Narendra Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister in May. The BJP is a right-wing party whose parent organization is a Hindu nationalist organization: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer/Patriotic Organization). The BJP alone commands a parliamentary majority for the first time since the 1989 general election in India.
With its election slogan of Shreshtha Bharat (Great India) and high economic growth, the BJP has sought to capture the people’s imagination by presenting a plan to make India a richer and stronger nation. The election manifesto was settled in Modi’s favor after an intra-party struggle. The slogan of Great India was an effective means of stimulating the Indian people to feel happy, serving as the best means in terms of domestic political mobilization.
Modi has brought about a popular majority with the so-called Modi Wave. He is truly at the helm of the government. Moreover, his approach as Prime Minister is unprecedented in Indian diplomatic history. He is not a follower of the so-called Nehru diplomacy, unlike all his predecessors, including the BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee. 10 Modi is a perfect follower of Sardar Patel, the first Home Minister and later Deputy Prime Minister (August 1947 to December 1950). Where Nehru was an idealist, pragmatist, and realist, Patel was thoroughly realistic and pragmatic. 11
Modi’s foreign policy orientation was apparent at an early stage in his remarks at Chennai on 18 October 2013 during the election campaign: ‘India's foreign policy should be built on the foundation of our culture, tradition, strength, economy, trade, strategy and security.’ After becoming Prime Minister, Modi emphasized the gist of his foreign policy orientation at the meeting of Heads of Indian Missions in February 2015. He urged them to use the present unique opportunity to help India position itself in a leading role, rather than just a balancing force globally 12 (emphasis added). Indian people have not in general been surprised at Modi’s pronouncement which they regard as the natural corollary of the BJP’s election manifesto.
However, when Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (the second son of K. Subrahmanyam), who was appointed to the post by Modi, declared on 20 July 2015 at his IISS-Fullerton Lecture (Singapore): India’s foreign policy dimension is ‘to aspire to be a leading power, rather than just a balancing power’ 13 (emphasis added), his speech marked the first time a high-ranking Indian official had made public such an intention. A great difference exists, however, between playing a leading role and being a leading power: the former is abstract, but the latter is concrete in terms of its implications. Although his speech was talked about in several of India’s national newspapers, apparently its significance was not clearly noticed. 14 India’s unannounced Taoguang Yanghui was set aside.
Therefore, India has self-evidently crossed the threshold of circumscribing its self-imposed external stance: from negation to affirmation of its aspiration to be a major power. This change of stance might be attributable to Modi, the first non-Nehruvian Prime Minister of India.
As pointed out previously, India has basic attributes of various magnitudes and a geopolitical position sufficient for status as a major power. During the Cold War period, India's national power was deficient, in terms of economy and defense. Therefore, it seemed only a pipe dream that India might someday become a major power. In the 2016 world rankings, India now ranks seventh in terms of national GDP (Japan ranks third) 15 and fifth in terms of defense expenditures (Japan ranks eighth). 16
At the moment, the US is the largest and the only major power. China chases it, as does India, although it remains one or two lengths behind China. There appears to be no other emerging country with an objective, like India’s, to become a major power. In fact, the National Intelligence Council of the US predicted as early as 2012 that: ‘In 2030 India could be the rising economic powerhouse that China is seen to be today. China’s current economic growth rate – 8–10% – will probably be a distant memory by 2030’ ( National Intelligence Council, 2012, p. 36). 17
Nevertheless, in reality, for overseas observers and scholars, the substance of India’s foreign policy has been extremely difficult to grasp because India deploys its policies depending upon circumstances and timings. India sometimes leans on the US and Japan while at other times befriending China and Russia. Such foreign postures have continually puzzled outsiders.
To resolve India’s conundrum of foreign policy and how India endeavors to achieve its foreign policy objective, I have formulated India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala) as shown below. The Matrix aims at attempting to present an overall framework of contemporary India’s foreign policy framework. Although enormous works by many scholars and practitioners, both domestic and foreign, on India’s foreign policy exist, they almost uniformly deal with individual case studies. Several anthologies combine a theoretical analysis of Indian foreign policy and its approach to individual countries in a bilateral context. 18
India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala)
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India’s Foreign Policy Matrix (Mandala)
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The Matrix is a provisional attempt to delve into India’s foreign policy and provide a grand outlook. India since the 2000s onward has been unfolding various foreign policies depending on regions to a greater or lesser degree. Such tendencies of foreign policy implementation have turned out to be distinctive in the mid-2010s.
The Matrix has several characteristics. First, it constitutes the three tiers of levels: the Global level, the Regional (Indo-Pacific region) level, and the Local (South Asia region) level. Each level has specific and different objectives with corresponding measures.
The inconsistencies in Indian approaches at the three levels tend to puzzle outsiders, as India has always appeared to be ‘playing off’ major powers to achieve its diverse interests. Perhaps such various differentiations make outsiders wonder at the objectives and contents of India’s foreign policy, unlike the non-alignment policy and the alliance with the Soviet Union. Japan’s newspapers tend to characterize India’s foreign policy as omnidirectional, 19 an overly superficial view. Even Indian experts have not analyzed their country’s foreign policy structurally.
Second, from the standpoint of time sequence, the present and future objectives at the Global level are basically future aspirations to be achieved, particularly so, in the case of international order building capability. After the end of World War II, the US as the victorious nation, with its incomparable national power – half of the global GDP and extraordinary military capabilities – led the founding of political and economic institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the IMF. For India, the present and future objectives of the Regional and Local Levels are crucially important areas to achieve the Global objectives in the present and beyond.
Now, the outline of each level will be explained. The Global level is India’s overall target to achieve. The process of getting to that target would first be to establish multi-polarization of the international system and possibly at the same time to acquire its position as a pole in the international system in the coming years.
Next, India’s major and ultimate objectives – and China’s also – is to acquire the capability of international order building. At the moment, China is striving to emulate the US by equipping itself with similar capabilities through the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) along with the One Belt, One Road Initiative (BR Initiative), and other associated measures. Like China, India also dreams of having such capabilities in the future. In short, the two countries have aspirations to become rule-makers rather than rule followers as they have been in the past. Now China appears to be gradually acquiring such capability, while India is lagging behind. However, after acquiring such capabilities, what China and India's new international order desires to create is opaque.
To materialize these objectives, India cooperates with China and Russia vis-à-vis the US and other associated countries. India’s full memberships at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS summit signify its cooperation with Russia and China at the Global level. If one regards China, Russia, and India as revisionist powers, then the US and its associated countries could be termed statusquo powers. For India, membership of the UN Security Council and other measures would be one of its first major gambits.
At the Regional level (Indo-Pacific region), India is striving to achieve a dominant position and to display its relative presence through joining hands with the US, Japan, and other like-minded countries while facing China. One of Japan’s South Asian security specialists pointed out, ‘it is natural that Japan designs Indo-Japan cooperation in tandem with the India-Japan-US trilateral cooperation’ ( Izuyama, 2013, p. 195). It is said Japan–India security relations could be seen as distinctively apparent in the field of maritime cooperation ( Kiyota, 2016, pp. 175–191). More specifically, building the interoperability of the two navies and undergirding peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region are said to be indispensable ( Nagao, 2017, p. 71).
At the Local level (South Asia), India has become a de facto major power in consolidating its dominant position. It does not hesitate to cooperate with the US and others in matters directly or indirectly related to China, but it would fundamentally prefer to act independently, particularly in the Indian Ocean ( Jain and Horimoto, 2016, pp. 26–42).
For India, the realization of foreign policy objectives at the Regional and Local levels would help in cementing its final Global objectives which are more long term in nature. India’s leading power aspirations would cause a ‘ripple-effect’ to the future configuration of Asia’s international relations.
Thus, India’s foreign policy is neither omnidirectional nor double-dealing. It is possible to point out in the coming one or two decades that the Matrix might transform its present three levels to two levels, concomitant with changes of objectives and measures.
Ultimately the characteristics of a future international order are expected to be based on the relationships between the major powers of Asia and their political ambitions.
At the moment, India's two closest partners are Russia and Japan. For India, from the viewpoint of the Matrix, the main raison d'être of its relations with Russia exists at the Global level whereas Japan operates at the Regional level. Maybe, for Russia and Japan, India’s aspiration is seen to be transformation into a major power. Its concretization would be welcome in terms of coping with the emerging and assertive China against the backdrop of obfuscating and elusive perceptions and implementation of US policy toward China, particularly so under the Trump administration.
Regarding Russian relations with India, several factors underlie their close relationship. India maintained its close relations with the Soviet Union during the 1970s and the 1980s. Even after the Union devolved into Russia and several independent republics, India established its a strategic partnership in 2000 with Russia preceded only by South Africa (1997) and France (1998). India and Russia have held bilateral annual summits since 2000. At that time, Russia was the only country with which India held a regular summit. They continue to the present day. It is noteworthy that Russian affairs tend to be off the table when India’s foreign policy is discussed in Japan.
At the Global level since the 1990s, India has never been a member of mini-lateral 20 international organizations. India ended such practices in 2003 when the IBSA Dialogue Forum was established, consisting of India, Brazil, and South Africa. In fact, during its first meeting, they agreed on the urgent necessity for reform of the UN, particularly the Security Council. These three countries have common traits: democratic countries and leading candidates to be future permanent members of the UN Security Council.
India joined another mini-lateral meeting of the Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICs) Summit, which was established in 2009. The summit was re-named the BRICS summit when South Africa joined in 2011. The summit mainly addresses means of improving the global economic system and reforming international financial institutions. It is noteworthy that the three IBSA countries can be characterized as a group within the larger group (the BRICS Summit) to check the predominance of China (also that of the China–Russia combination).
If the summit represented the first chance for India to play its cards well, then another case was membership in the SCO, which is characterized as a Eurasian political, economic, and military organization. India has maintained observer status since 2005, mirroring US attendance of the Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). India, along with Pakistan, signed the memorandum of obligations on 2016, thereby starting the formal process of joining the SCO. They were designated as full members in 2017.
Moscow has consistently championed the admission of India to the SCO to balance China's dominance and strengthen the group's clout (Vladimir, 2011). However, China has objected to India’s membership under the pretext of a lack of standards and procedures. Subsequently, China has favored reviewing its unofficial moratorium on admitting new members in the wake of the planned drawdown of the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). China has prepared its own quid pro quo of India’s membership by admitting Pakistan as a full member, whereas other countries aspiring to be full members have been shelved.
India has its own calculations. India during the Manmohan Singh Government (May 2004 to May 2014) remained wary by not sending the Prime Minister to attend the SCO Summit except on one occasion, perhaps principally not to damage its relations with the US. When the BJP government came to power, India initiated its move to full membership after its relations with the US consolidated. Indian confidence held that the full membership of the SCO would not necessarily infuriate the US.
The two mini-lateral organizations of the BRICS Summit and the SCO have a common trait: Russia and China are members. Probably, India expects Russia to play a role of checking and balancing vis-à-vis China. Russia expects India to play a role of balancer vis-à-vis China. For India, the SCO also carries a significant implication in terms of its Central Asian diplomacy, which is yet to be fully explored politically and economically.
For India, its relations with Russia are indispensable in terms of acquisition of defense equipment and energy resources and also diplomatic cards vis-à-vis China and the US, although the bilateral trade between India and Russia has waned in importance 21 compared to the Indo-Soviet era.
Russia is followed by Japan as the country with the second-closest relations to India. 22 It might be possible to say Japan would be more important than Russia because of the recent international situations where Russia tends to be rather cooperative with China and the Indo-Pacific is of increasing importance for India.
To conclude this section in advance, economy and security are the two major engines bringing forth the contemporary close bilateral relations. In other words, the close relations are the result of growing convergence between the two countries’ world views, interests, and goals. In one way or another, these two factors are related to the emergence of China. As early as in 2006, it was pointed out that ‘In the emerging Asia, the two major non-Western democracies, India and Japan, look like natural allies as China drives them closer together’ ( Chellaney, 2006, p. 221).
Viewed from India’s diplomatic history, India’s close relations with Russia have far antedated those with Japan. In fact, Japan’s relations with India are a recent phenomenon that has unfolded during the past quarter century since the 1990s. 23
The transformation of Japan–India relations has transpired against the backdrop of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the shift of US policy to Asia with the US’ relative diminution of power, and particularly the rapid emergence of China.
Realistically speaking, as illustrated by various aspects of India’s Foreign Policy Matrix, India’s main foreign policy theater at the moment is confined primarily to the Regional Level (Indo-Pacific) and the Local level (South Asia). With the passage of time and following the consolidation of its interests at these two levels, India might then become more active at the Global level. India might still need time before becoming more active at the Global level. Russia’s presence is insufficient on a regional level whereas Japan’s presence (along with the US) constitutes an effective partnership vis-à-vis China. For Japan also, India could be a reliable cooperative partner in the Indo-Pacific. In short, at the moment, Japan and India have become, for all practical purposes, mutually indispensable partners: for Japan, to cope with the rise of China, to say the least of utilizing economic opportunities; and for India to buy time as it becomes a major power.
The development of the closer relationship of Japan and India might be described as a triple jump of hop, step, and jump: the 1990s, the 2000s, and then the 2010s onward. The favorable improvement in Japan–India relations, which began as a mere rivulet in the 1990s, grew into a stream in the early 2000s onward. By around 2005, it had gained all the momentum of a major river.
Such a metamorphosis of bilateral relations is readily apparent from the number of mutual VIP visits by prime ministers, cabinet ministers, and other high government officials of both countries. There were only 16 mutual visits of VIPs in the 1980s, but 27 in the 1990s, 84 in the 2000s, and 47 already in the first half of the 2010s. The gradual but sharp increases of mutual VIP visits clearly mark the rapprochement between the two countries. The Japan–India Nuclear Agreement of 2016 signified a major culmination of bilateral relations ( Tamari, 2017, pp. 232–237).
These close contacts paved the way for the bilateral annual summit between of the prime ministers of Japan and India which started in 2005. For Japan, India is the first and only country, whereas for India, Japan is the second country after Russia. The Strategic Partnership between the two countries was established in 2006. Consequently, India maintains close relations with Japan in addition to Russia.
Another major factor cementing these bilateral relations is economic relations. First, there is the so-called China risk. In 2004, Japan’s trade with China (including Hong Kong) reached 22 trillion yen, replacing the 20 trillion yen trade between Japan and the US. Thereby, China became Japan’s largest trading partner. In that year, markedly anti-Japanese behavior was displayed by Chinese spectators against Japanese players at the AFC Asian Cup football match in Chongqing, China in July 2004. Furthermore, between March and April in 2005, large-scale anti-Japanese riots targeting Japanese stores broke out in Chengdu, Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities.
This turn of events raised grave concern. As a consequence, ‘spurred by the anti-Japanese demonstrations occurring in China in spring that year, companies began increasing their direct investment in Vietnam and India to take advantage of the high growth and significant market scale expected in these countries, as well as to defuse the risk of investment concentration in China’ ( Tsutsumi, 2005). India’s China expert, Kondapalli, pointed out that: ‘It is only since 2005 that China started considering relations with India “strategic” in nature’ ( Kondapalli, 2013). It would not be sheer coincidence.
Secondly, Japan’s ODA to India plays a crucial role ( Jain 2017). Japan has been devoting attention to India as the destination of its ODA viewed from the angle of India’s bright prospect as an emerging market. Japan’s ODA has been serving as a forerunner of Japan’s exploration of new business opportunities ( Ghosh, 2017, pp. 71–80). India, with high economic potential and gigantic size, was evaluated as a worthwhile country to be a recipient of Japan’s major share of ODA. In fact, Japan has been the largest ODA provider to India from 1986 to the present day, except during 1998–2001 when Japan used economic measures 24 to protest India’s atomic testing in 1998. Since fiscal year 2003, the largest share of Japan’s ODA has been given to India, replacing China, the perennial leading recipient. Japan has been supporting various mega-infrastructure developments such as the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) and the Chennai–Bengaluru Industrial Corridor (CBIC) ( Choudhury, 2014; Kojima, 2017).
In 2011, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between Japan and India was promulgated. The Modi Government carries ‘Make in India’ in its economic policy and ‘Act East Policy’ 25 in its foreign policy, which combine well with Japan’s active and forward-looking posture toward India. The prime ministers of the two countries emphasized the importance of the Act East Policy and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in their joint statement of 2016.
Economic circumstances were certainly an important factor in the Japan–India rapprochement. An even more important factor is security policy, designed to cope with the rise of China as a common priority. Rather than initiation based on a clear policy direction, the mutual rapprochement policies adopted by both Japan and India were the result of fortuitous timing for gradual convergence since 2000 in the two countries’ foreign policy objectives on both economic and security fronts. One of India’s Japan specialists has suggested that the China factor has risen to the fore, and that it has assumed major importance in India–Japan relations ( Jain, 2007; Varma, 2013, p. 52).
Viewed from the perspective of their China policies, both countries’ policy needs might also be regarded as having drawn the two countries closer together, with engagement in economic areas and hedging in terms of security, although hedging and engagement are used infrequently these days in the US, where the phrase originated. This same double-sided policy of engagement and hedging underpinned the approaches to China pursued by the US and other of China’s neighbors, albeit with different degrees of intensity. India’s dual policy of engagement and hedging is a new policy orientation after the Cold War period. During the Cold War, India could not afford such a risky strategy because of its insufficient power. And thus it could only pursue an engagement policy.
The engagement and hedging policy might be regarded as India's response to China’s assertive external orientation in the 2000s and the 2010s, particularly since Xi Jinping reached power in China in 2012 as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. He underscored the importance of the Dream of China. His Chinese Dream is described as ‘achieving the “Two 100s”: The material goal of China becoming a “moderately well-off society” by about 2020, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the modernization goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by about 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic’ ( Kuhn, 2013). In other words, the Dream of China is a national construction project producing a wealthy superpower with a powerful military ( Mifune, 2016, p. 31). China’s assertive policies are likely to continue to achieve its two dreams.
Perhaps, when China realizes its dream, it might acquire international order building capability. However, it is not clear what concrete institutions and systems China would create based on its capability. India's ambitions in this respect are even more opaque than those of China. China is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and concretizing various plans such as the AIIB and the BR Initiative, implying a new world order, whereas India is not a permanent UN Security Council member and does not have plans like those of China.
Viewed in this way, the China factor seems unlikely to disappear in the Indo-Pacific region in the coming years. In the region, Japan and India, the most affected countries, will continue their close relations and join together along with the ASEAN countries, Australia, and the US, even beyond the personally close relationship between the leaders Abe and Modi ( Horimoto, 2014a). Albeit, personal relationships between top leaders exert influence more or less on bilateral diplomatic relations. Abe, who promotes a pro-active foreign policy, appears to be keener to have close relations than Modi ( Basu 2016).
Additionally, we should not rule out another possibility that continued tension between India and Pakistan nudges India to opt for maintaining close relations with Japan in considerations of the power relations among the US, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, and Japan. Probably, the power gap separating India and China can be expected to dwindle gradually. Thereafter, China, instead of direct confrontation with India, might choose to enhance its all-weather diplomatic relations 26 with Pakistan to limit India’s influence to South Asia or to obstruct India’s expansion of national influence in Asia. It is possible that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is an integral part of the BR initiative, would enhance China–Pakistan relations. Conversely India–Pakistan relations would aggravate further.
Putting it in another way, ‘the enduring Sino-Pak partnership has long been seen in New Delhi as aimed at boxing India within the subcontinent and preventing it from ever emerging as a rival to China in Asia and beyond’ ( Mohan, 2012, p. 21). China’s support of Pakistan can be expected to keep India–Pakistan tensions intensified or at least persistent: a situation of tension by proxy. 27
Consequently, India might augment its relations with Japan as an important countermeasure. For Japan, which relies closely on the US only, India is an indispensable country. Beyond dovetailing mutual strategic interest, Japan and India should take the lead to create a stable multipolar Asia ( Rajagopalan, 2012, p. 252). 28
Against such a backdrop how would Japan–India and other elements of India’s foreign policy proceed? Plainly speaking, the present bilateral relations can be characterized as a relationship of convenience based on mutual necessity and benefit. The two countries would make the best use of their present close relations to maximize their respective national interests.
However, one might notice that subtle differences of perceptions exist between the two countries toward China, although fundamentally the two countries are commonly adopting engagement and hedging policies. Japan looks to try to prevent China from occupying the dominant position in Asia, particularly in the Western Pacific region in cooperation with the US and other like-minded countries, whereas India’s basic orientation is to maintain stable relations with China.
When the Modi government rose to power, Sandy Gordon of the Australia National University noted the government’s attempt to ‘play both ends against the middle’, especially since this approach has been a classic feature of Indian foreign policy. Under this scenario, India would seek the best deal it can from China, both economically and in terms of a possible border settlement, while attempting to maintain its hedge against a possible difficult rise of China with powers such as the US and Japan ( Gordon, 2014).
In a similar vein, Kanwal Sibal, the former Foreign Secretary of India, remarked: ‘Japan’s economic stakes in China are huge; our own political and economic stakes in China are high, given China’s contiguity with us and our direct exposure to its power. Neither Japan nor India seek a confrontation with China, but both have a responsibility to build lines of defence against any disruptive exercise of power by a rising China’ ( Sibal, 2014).
Prime Minister Modi, since coming to power in May 2014, looks to have been practicing his foreign policy, as predicted by two experts. President Mukherjee’s Parliamentary Address on 9 June 2014 might be particularly revealing of Modi’s policy framework: ‘We will pursue our international engagement based on enlightened national interest, combining the strength of our values with pragmatism.’ 29
The Matrix presented herein shows that Modi has been practicing his policy of expediting economic growth and expanding defense capabilities to create a rich and powerful nation. For Modi, a strong economy means not only the economy per se, but also the infrastructure of his diplomacy: ‘A strong economy is a base of effective foreign policy.’ 30 He appears to be implementing his foreign policy from the perspective of geo-economics rather than geopolitics.
Nevertheless, he is compelled to confront the dilemma of domestic politics versus foreign policy. For example, the issue has arisen of a Trade Facilitation Agreement with economic benefits said to be worth 1 trillion US dollars. India agreed to join it in December 2013 in Bali with a grace period of four years with regard to its agricultural procurements. However, in July 2014, India backpedalled due to considerations of farmers’ concerns. Such a tendency is discernible in the case of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiated in 2013, which was to have been concluded by 2015 (extended to 2017).
His slogan of Make in India must be seen in the context of the interests of consumers and other relevant parties in India. He must cope with the difficult political dichotomy of localism versus globalism.
Japan is struck by typhoons in summer and autumn every year. When the Japan Meteorological Agency forecasts that a typhoon is heading towards Japan, the agency cannot say exactly when and where it might strike. In the same vein, India appears to be heading toward a global power status now and is metamorphosing into a major power, but it remains unpredictable ‘when’ that might occur.
Various influences are likely to affect India’s journey to take the mantle of a major power in the future. Among them, the US and China might be the most influential factors at the Regional level (Indo-Pacific region).
Many Indian newspapers predicted that US President Trump would be likely to boost the Indian–US strategic relationship with special emphasis on defense ties and counter-terrorism cooperation. Prime Minister Modi was the fifth world leader to speak with Trump both soon after the US Presidential election and also after the inauguration. 31 Trump and Modi certainly have a common perception related to Israel and Islamic fundamentalism. Setting aside their personal predilections, no one knows for sure what will happen to Indian–US relations because of Trump’s renowned unpredictability.
At the moment, perhaps, the Trump administration’s main concerns are how to address Asian issues such as China, the Western Pacific, North Korea, and the Middle East quagmires. South Asia and the Indian Ocean would be positioned as circumferential issues. Therefore, India might be able to afford to wait and see how the US–China relations develop. Simultaneously with their development, India can deploy its foreign policy.
If we assume that India is on the verge of becoming a major power, then it might be necessary to provide a theoretical explanation of its emergence. Such aspects have been completely lacking in India by the 2000s. Upon entering the 2010s, when India showed its upswing, there appeared some moves, particularly among the strategic community of India.
Reflecting atmosphere, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (under the Ministry of Defence) started various seminars on The Arthasyastra and Kautilya since 2012. The Arthashastra 32 is an ancient Indian treatise on statecraft, economic policy, and military strategy, written in Sanskrit. Kautilya is traditionally credited as the author of the treatise. In India, the treatise is often likened proudly to China’s The Art of War by Sun Tsu. It can be said that the Arthashastra is the fountainhead of India’s international politics ( Ito, 2015).
Shivshankar Menon, the former National Security Advisor and presumed to be one of prominent members of India’s strategic community, has insisted during one of the seminars in October 2014 that India’s strategic thoughts have been imported from overseas. He has asserted that they instead must have maximum strategic autonomy, and that one should read the Arthashastra. 33
When the first convention of the Indian Association of International Studies was held in 2012, Amitabh Mattoo congratulated its establishment in his opening remarks but simultaneously warned: ‘If Asia merely mimics the West in its quest for economic growth and conspicuous consumption, and the attendant conflict over economic resources and military prowess, the “revenge of the East” in the Asian century and “all its victories” will remain “truly Pyrrhic”’ ( Mattoo, 2012).
Be that as it may, India’s pursuit of its own theoretical international relations remains at an inchoate stage. For that reason, India cannot help but start with its political classics to formulate a theoretical foundation as its gambit.
Entering the 2010s, India has just started to explore measures and plans to achieve major power status alongside a new international framework to be formulated to legitimize its rise to power. This is perhaps the way in which India tries to respond to the power transformation in Asia and in the world. India is recognized generally as a major power in the future. However, for legitimization, India needs to devise universally acceptable narratives, though this might be an uphill task and challenge. Probably, one of the keywords would be inclusivity as India has propounded over the past seven decades. In order to realize such narratives, Japan–India relations should be molded in a way which is neither exclusive nor antagonistic toward China ( Ito, 2013, pp. 113–131; Singh, 2013, pp. 133–152). Kesavan, the senior most East Asian specialist, pointed out that: ‘India believes in constructing a transparent, inclusive and democratic regional order free from the hegemony of any single country’ ( Kesavan, 2015).
Modi’s ascent to power constitutes a historic confluence of interests and opportunities. After the end of the Cold War, various models such as the Washington consensus, the Beijing consensus, and the Arab spring have been attempted without much success. Now India’s attempt to develop as a major power under a liberal democratic setup might carry great historic significance.
In that sense, the country watching India’s future with the greatest curiosity is likely to be China. India’s success in achieving its ultimate aims would deal the strongest blow to China, which increasingly serves domestic demands for economic equality more than it meets mounting clamour for democratic rights.
How can Modi and his successors successfully coordinate and accommodate domestic policies and foreign policies? Upon overcoming these challenges, India might be making a great step forward to becoming a major power in the future. No one would object to the perception that a power transformation or shift is taking place in Asia. The most important issue might be whether the shift turns out to be a paradigm shift, bringing about the emergence of a new international order. In tandem, India would be required to put forward its vision of how it will function as a global major power. K. Subrahmanyam stressed the importance of India’s grand strategy 34 in an article made public immediately after his death as he requested ( Subrahmanyam, 2012) (May 2017).
India’s membership of major powers would be conditioned on whether the US as a superpower recognizes India as a major power ( Nayar and Paul, 2004, pp. 113).
Article IX of that treaty stipulated ‘In the event of either being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.’ The article is available at http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty+of+ (20 March 2017, date last accessed).
The Guardian (1971, August 10) described it as ‘departure from the Indian policy of non-alignment’.
In contrast, China has consistently implemented its independent foreign policy without alignment. China ceased to align with other countries in the early 1960s, when its close relations with the Soviet Union faltered.
BRICs changed its acronym to BRICS when South Africa joined the BRICs summit in 2010.
Times of India (2011, December 18, paper edition).
No clear-cut definition of the term exists in India. Generally, those who are engaging in foreign and national security issues comprise such experts as university professors, think-tank analysts, ex-officials of the Ministries of External Affairs and Defence, and journalists. They are opinion makers-cum-leaders influencing India’s external policies.
An interview with Wang Jisi ( American Studies Center of Peking University) regarded as the foreign policy advisor to Hu Jintao (then President of China) appeared in the Asahi Shimbun of 5 October 2012 (paper edition). He said the line did not apply to India and Japan.
Vijay Goel, Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office, has known Vajpayee for about 30 years. When Goel asked who his favorite leader was, he named Nehru, available at http://muraleedharan.tripod.com/legends_vajpayee.html (2 March 2017, date last accessed).
Modi has initiated its foreign policy of placating, utilizing and restraining vis-à-vis China ( Takenaka, 2014).
PM to Heads of Indian Missions on 7 February 2015, available at http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pm-to-heads-of-indian-missions/?comment=disable (21 March 2017, date last accessed).
In India and the US, noted specialists on India’s foreign policy were rather late in commenting on Jaishankar’s speech. See Tellis (2016), Mohan (2016) and Huntsman and Gopalaswamy (2015).
World Development Indicators database, Gross Domestic product 2016, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (20 May 2017, date last accessed).
SIPRI Fact Sheet, Trends in world military expenditure, 2016, available at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-world-military-expenditure-2016.pdf (20 May 2017, date last accessed).
Its report also predicted ‘As the world’s largest economic power, China is expected to remain ahead of India, but the gap could begin to close by 2030. India’s rate of economic growth is likely to rise while China’s slows (Ibid.).’
One of the most interesting resources and one overlapping with my objective is Karnad (2015). As the title of the book Why India is not a Great Power (yet) suggests, it is the first of its kind discussing India’s emergence as a major power. Karnad laments this is attributable to the lack of combination between economic and hard power policy orientations and stress the importance of military and economic trajectories have complemented each other. Ganguly (2010), Khilnani et al. (2012), Bajpai and Pant (2013) show us excellent examinations of India’s foreign policy, but they do not cover the period under the Modi government. Malone et al. (2015) could be termed as an encyclopedia of India’s foreign policy with more than 700 pages but it is noteworthy that it does not include addressing issues such as major power status or Japan.
For example, Japan’s newspaper, Sankei Shimbun (2014, October 7, paper edition), termed Modi’s approach and stance to the US and Japan as unrestrained by its traditionally continued omnidirectional foreign policy.
The term ‘mini-lateral’ might be used to designate a small group of countries situated just between bilateral and multilateral.
India’s trade with Russia in 2016–17 is not ranked within the India’s top 25 countries (Department of Commerce, Government of India, Export Import Data Bank, 16 April 2017, available at http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnttopn.asp (20 April 2017, date last accessed).
Reflecting the recent development of closer bilateral relations, there emerge various publications: Khan (2017), Borah (2017); Mukherjee and Yazaki (2016).
The two countries enjoyed a brief honeymoon period after mutual relations were established in 1952. They did not last, however, because efforts to foster the relationship were thwarted by the unfolding Cold War. The two countries pursued incompatible policy orientations in terms of foreign policy and economic policy. Therefore, the present phase might possibly be regarded as the second honeymoon period. For detailed discussions, see Horimoto (2016).
An official terminology used by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs instead of economic sanction. For details, see ( Tamari, 2017, pp. 226–227).
‘Change ′Look East Policy′ to ′Act East Policy′: Sushma Swaraj,’ NDTV (2014, August 25), available at http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/time-to-change-look-east-policy-to-act-east-policy-sushma-swaraj-653063 (2 March 2017, date last accessed).
On 20 April 2015, China and Pakistan elevated their relations by their ‘Joint Statement on Establishing an All-Weather Strategic Co-operative Partnership during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan’ (The Express Tribune, 2015, April 21), available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/873290/strategic-partnership-pakistan-china-ties-hit-a-new-high/ (18 April 2017, date last accessed). All weather relations have been repeatedly stated in their bilateral documents but it was the first time their relations were officially characterized as All- Weather Strategic Co-operative Partnership.
Ed Royce, Chairman House Foreign Affairs Committee (the US) said in his opening statement in 16 December 2015 ‘But while the U.S. was quick to embrace Pakistan, Pakistan has hardly reciprocated. Pakistani Governments have come and gone, but its northwestern frontier has remained a terrorist haven. With its security services supporting what it considers to be good Islamist terrorist groups, these good groups—under Pakistan’s calculus— destabilize Afghanistan and threaten neighboring India while the government simultaneously opposes what it considers the bad Islamist groups’ ( Royce, 2015).
The book admirably delves into the military strategies of four powers (China, the US, Ruassia and Japan).
The President of India is vested with all the executive authority but, in practice exercised by the Prime Minister with the help of the Council of Ministers (Article 53 of the Constitution of India).
